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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
Coram Nobis
In People r. Sullivan;2 the Court affirmed a denial of defendant's second
motion for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate a judgment of conviction. A
court will hear new evidence but the sufficiency of that evidence to merit a new
hearing is a matter of discretion and, absent an abuse of discretion, a determina-
tion will not be reversed. In this instance, the second motion contained substan-
tially the same basis for relief as the first. The court had heard and denied
defendant's first motion and hence there was no reason for a new hearing.
In People v. Picciotti,33 the Court granted a writ of error coram nobis. The
Court affirmed the doctrine that a convicted defendant moving by way of coram
nobis to set aside his conviction on the ground that it was secured by coercion
will not be denied a trial if the allegations are not conclusively shown to be false
by opposing papers.34 Defendant alleged that a plea of guilty was procured by
threats of a prosecuting official to revive five-year-old indictments and to see to
it that the punishment inflicted would be especially severe if he did not plead
guilty. The affidavit of the official and the transcript of the proceedings in court
submitted in opposition to defendant's application were not considered by the
Court to be conclusive evidence of the falsity of defendant's allegations. The Court
realistically stated that the coercive conversation, if it did take place at all, would
not be made in open court. The Court also said that the fact that defendant's
attorney advised him to plead guilty in no way rendered defendant's claim less
effective.
The dissent, citing People v. White,3 5 took the view that the defendant's
allegation must be confirmed by the record to warrant the granting of a hearing.
Since the court in the White case repeatedly stressed that defendant's allega-
tions were refuted by the record, the language relied upon by the dissent
constitutes but slight authority for its position. The majority advocate a hearing
unless refuted by the record, whereas the dissent requires support in the record
before a hearing will be granted. The position of the majority seems more in
accord with the fundamental concepts of constitutional due process in that
coercion such as the defendant here alleges would not appear in the record, and
coram nobis was developed to cover this type of situation .3  Under the dissent's
theory, since the record is silent concerning coercion, the defendant is left without
a remedy and stands convicted without due process of law.
32. 4 N.Y.2d 472, 176 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1958).
33. 4 N.Y.2d 340, 175 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1958).
34. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 97 N.E.2d 105 (1951); People v. Lain,
309 N.Y. 291, 130 N.E.2d 105 (1955); 7 ButALo L. REV. 130 (1957).
35. 309 N.Y. 636, 132 N.E.2d 880 (1956).
36. See People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957); People
v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949).
